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Abstract
This article recommends six improvements in regard to 
women’s equality rights in Canadian constitutionalism. 
They are: 1) detail the harms; 2) advocate women’s 
equality; 3) delete formal equality; 4) make equality 
absolute; 5) stop comparing women; and 6) recognize 
intersectionality. Some of these recommendations are 
directed to legislators; others to judges. It is premature 
for women to celebrate. Canada’s constitutional 
guarantees of women’s equality rights are inadequate to 
the task of protecting us.
Résumé
Cet article recommande six améliorations en ce qui 
concerne les droits à l’égalité des femmes dans le 
constitutionnalisme canadien. Il s’agit des suivantes : 1) 
préciser les préjudices; 2) prôner l’égalité des femmes; 3) 
supprimer l’égalité formelle; 4) rendre l’égalité absolue; 
5) cesser de comparer les femmes; et 6) reconnaître 
l’intersectionnalité. Certaines de ces recommandations 
s’adressent aux législateurs; d’autres aux juges. Il est 
trop tôt encore pour crier victoire. Les garanties 
constitutionnelles des droits à l’égalité des femmes au 
Canada sont insuffisantes pour nous protéger.
Introduction
Is it wrong to celebrate the work of the women 
who lobbied for a more meaningful guarantee of wom-
en’s equality rights in the Canadian Constitution? As 
one of these women, I never imagined asking this ques-
tion. Its implication—that the Constitution might not 
protect women’s sex equality rights—was unthinkable. 
After all, the women’s lobby succeeded in convincing 
politicians to include two sex equality guarantees in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter).2 A 
year later, Aboriginal women successfully lobbied for 
the inclusion of another sex equality guarantee in the 
Constitution Act, 1982.3 I set out the full texts of these 
three guarantees in Part 1 of this article. Recognizing 
how clearly they express the right to sex equality is es-
sential to deciding whether to celebrate the women who 
lobbied for their inclusion in the Canadian Constitu-
tion.
However, something more is required to an-
swer this question. Like all legal texts, these guaran-
tees are subject to interpretation by judges. We must 
ask how the highest court in the land, the Supreme 
Court of Canada, has decided cases in which parties 
invoked the constitutional guarantee of sex equality. 
Part 2 contains a brief survey of this jurisprudence. In 
the thirty years since Canada adopted the Constitution 
Act, 1982, women relied on their right to sex equali-
ty in five cases, all of which they lost. By comparison 
men claimed sex equality rights in four cases; they lost 
the first two, but won the remainder. This record sug-
gests that the unthinkable happened: the constitution-
al guarantees of sex equality did not protect women. 
Part 3 subscribes to the adage: “There is always room 
for improvement.”
Part 1. The Constitutional Texts
The three written guarantees of sex equality are 
found in sections 15 and 28 of the Charter and in sec-
tion 35(4) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The text of each 
follows with a brief introductory comment. 
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Before 1982, the Canadian Constitution con-
tained no protection of sex equality or of equality rights 
more generally. What became section 15 represents the 
general attempt to protect equality rights, including a 
prohibition against discrimination on the ground of 
sex. The opposition to entrenching section 15 focused 
on the general idea of protecting equality rights and not 
specifically on that of protecting sex equality, unlike the 
situation that had obtained 20 years earlier when the 
federal government adopted an equality rights provi-
sion in the Canadian Bill of Rights.4 
During debate on the Canadian Bill of Rights in 
1960, then Minister of Justice Davie Fulton felt com-
pelled to offer the following reassurance specifically 
about including sex in the list of grounds protected in 
the general equality rights provision: “I do feel that the 
expression…would not be interpreted by the courts so 
as to say we are making men and women equal, be-
cause men and women are not equal; they are differ-
ent.”5 His words may have resonated with Justice Ro-
land Ritchie, who wrote the majority opinions for the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the two sex equality cases 
litigated under the Canadian Bill of Rights. First, they 
denied that section 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act discrim-
inated against women by depriving them of their In-
dian status if they married out even though men who 
married out did not lose their Indian status.6 Then, the 
Justices told Stella Bliss that the Unemployment Insur-
ance Act did not discriminate against her when she was 
denied both pregnancy benefits and regular unemploy-
ment benefits.7
In the 1980-1982 discussions about the Charter, 
the women’s lobby was determined to word the equality 
rights provision in such a way as to counter any sugges-
tion that it resembled the version in the Canadian Bill of 
Rights. Ultimately section 15 provided:
s. 15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the 
law and has the right to equal protection and equal ben-
efit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical dis-
ability.
(2) Subsection 1 does not preclude any law, program or ac-
tivity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions 
of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those 
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical dis-
ability.8
Section 15(1) is the general equality rights provision 
and section 15(2) is the provision that protects affirma-
tive action programs.
Understanding that governments in Canada 
might try to justify infringing the equality rights pro-
tected in section 15 by invoking the limitations clause 
in section 1 of the Charter,9 women also lobbied for an-
other equality guarantee. We argued for a new provision 
that would refer only to the right to sex equality, thereby 
emphasizing the singular importance of sex equality in 
the overall culture of rights protections (Baines 2005, 
55). As well, we maintained that this guarantee should 
not be subject to the limitations clause in section 1. In 
other words, governments should never be permitted 
to justify infringing the guarantee of sex equality when 
this new provision is invoked. Our efforts resulted in 
section 28 which provides:
s. 28. Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights 
and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to 
male and female persons.10
Of this provision Linda Ryan Nye presciently conclud-
ed: “Twenty-eight was a helluva lot to lose…But it was 
not a helluva lot to win” (Kome 1983, 95).
Within a year of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982, the first ministers met with Aboriginal 
leaders to discuss constitutional matters affecting Ab-
original peoples. As the result of an Aboriginal women’s 
lobby, they added the third sex equality provision to the 
Constitution Act, 1982. This provision is section 35(4) 
which provides:
s. 35. (4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection 
(1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.11
This provision was included to protect Aboriginal wom-
en’s right to sex equality because some Aboriginal rights 
are articulated outside the Charter, but within the Con-
stitution Act, 1982 in section 35. 
The similarities between section 35(4) and sec-
tion 28 are noteworthy, as are the similarities between 
these two provisions in the Constitution Act, 1982 
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and the provision that Québec subsequently added to 
the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms in 
2008.12 When section 15 of the Canadian Charter is 
added to the foregoing provisions, it is obvious that our 
constitutional texts recognize the normative impor-
tance of sex equality.
Part 2. The Jurisprudence
In this section, I describe how the constitution-
al texts and the jurisprudence part company. While the 
former explicitly and repeatedly guarantee sex equality, 
the latter reveals that the Supreme Court of Canada has 
denied this right in all five of the cases where women 
raised it. Of course, the women might have been wrong 
to believe they were entitled to sex equality, but it is a 
stretch to attribute such a mistake to all five of these cas-
es. I propose to explain why it was the Supreme Court 
and not the women who were wrong. The court mis-
understood the constitutional norm of sex equality, a 
misunderstanding that also permeated the four cases in 
which men claimed sex equality rights. 
First, the women’s cases. Four of the five were 
split decisions. Moreover, the justices split along gender 
lines. The majority justices were always men; the wom-
en justices always dissented. The fifth and most recent 
case was a unanimous opinion, raising a question about 
whether the women justices have given up dissenting.
In the earliest decision in 1993, the male ma-
jority told Beth Symes that the Income Tax Act did 
not discriminate against women by not recognizing 
childcare expenses as a business tax deduction.13 Next, 
in 1994, they told the Native Women’s Association of 
Canada (NWAC) that Canada was not discriminating 
against them by refusing to fund their participation 
in the constitutional discussions that led to Charlotte-
town Accord.14 Then, the court decided in 1995 that the 
Income Tax Act did not discriminate against Suzanne 
Thibaudeau by compelling her, rather than her ex-hus-
band, to pay the income tax on the alimony she received 
from him.15 In the fourth case, the male justices told the 
Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority 
Women in 1999 that denying them charitable status un-
der the Income Tax Act was not discriminatory.16 Final-
ly, in the only unanimous decision, the court decided 
in 2004 that Newfoundland did not have to honour a 
pay equity agreement it had signed in favour of female 
employees in the healthcare sector.17
Although these five cases qualified as sex equal-
ity contests because women were burdened because 
they were women, none would have burdened men as 
men had the outcomes been different. If Beth Symes 
had won, women and men could both have claimed 
childcare expenses as a business tax deduction. If 
NWAC had won, the money would have come from the 
state and not the pockets of the other male-dominated 
Aboriginal organizations. If Suzanne Thibaudeau had 
won, her husband would have paid income tax on his 
own earnings as is required of all other taxpayers. If the 
Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority 
Women had won, its charitable status would have had 
no impact on men. And finally, if the Newfoundland 
Association of Public Employees (NAPE) had won, the 
province and not men per se would have been required 
to conform to its responsibilities under the pay equity 
agreement that it had signed. In virtually every case, in 
other words, the state and not men would have borne 
the burden of equalizing the conditions under which 
women work.
In sum, while the constitutional text guarantees 
the right to sex equality, from the standpoint of women, 
the jurisprudence of the highest court in the land has 
rendered this guarantee meaningless—in judgments 
rendered, for the most part, by men who were protect-
ing the state. Nor were they the same men. From the 
Symes decision in 1993 to the NAPE decision in 2004, 
there was an almost complete turnover in male justices 
with only Justice John Major sitting on both cases. Yet, 
their conclusions remained the same; they protected the 
state and denied women’s sex equality claims. Similarly, 
only one woman, Justice and, since 2000, Chief Justice 
Beverley McLachlin sat on both Symes and NAPE. She 
joined the unanimous court in NAPE. What can we 
conclude about gendered decision making—the wom-
en gave up resisting? It is too small a sample and too 
soon to draw this conclusion, but it is worth keeping a 
watching brief. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, men have fared much 
better when they bring sex discrimination claims un-
der the Charter. While they lost the first two, they won 
the next two. In the two cases they lost, unlike the five 
cases women lost, the men’s losses redounded to wom-
en’s benefit. In other words, they emphasized the reci-
procity that we might have assumed would characterize 
sex equality cases. Moreover, one of their wins also im-
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proved the position of women. But the most recent win 
harmed women.
In the first case, Justice Bertha Wilson decided 
in 1990 that two men accused of statutory rape could 
not use sex discrimination to strike down the statu-
tory rape provision (which was then, but is no longer, 
written in gendered language).18 In the second, Justice 
Gerard La Forest told male prison inmates in 1993 that 
limiting cross-gender frisk searches to male prisoners 
was not discriminatory, but rather, the result of a new 
federal government affirmative action hiring policy 
to ensure that some women could work as guards in 
men’s prisons.19 Although initiated by men, these two 
cases protected women’s equality rights and the next 
case advanced them. In it, Justice Frank Iacobucci told 
Mark Benner in 1997 that requiring a security check of 
citizenship applicants who were children born abroad 
of Canadian mothers, but not of those born abroad of 
Canadian fathers, was discriminatory because it treat-
ed mothers, but not fathers, as dangerous transmitters 
of birthrights.20 However, the fourth men’s case harmed 
women’s equality rights. In it, Justice Marie Deschamps 
ruled in 2003 that British Columbia’s Vital Statistics Act 
discriminated against men because it provided birth 
mothers with discretion to “unacknowledge” (i.e. not 
name) biological fathers on birth registration forms and 
to not consult them when attributing surnames to their 
babies.21
Since men’s equality rights claims may either 
assist or harm women’s equality rights claims, they of-
fer no reliable guarantee of protection for women’s sex 
equality. Women are the objects, not the subjects, of 
these claims with no control over how they are framed 
or argued. Indeed, as the fourth men’s case illustrates, 
the reciprocity they usually evoke can be toxic for 
women. What he wins (potentially lifelong interfer-
ence), she may lose (independence in all childrearing 
matters).
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s sex equali-
ty jurisprudence only protected girls in statutory rape 
cases, women hired as cross-gender prison guards, 
and mothers who give birth to children while abroad. 
These were three good decisions—although the first 
and the third are no longer necessary thanks to leg-
islative amendments removing the gender specificity 
of the impugned provisions. Moreover, women had 
no reason to bring either the statutory rape or the 
cross-gender guarding cases; they were fought by men 
who, if they had won, would have harmed women. 
Only the birthright case survives as a case that could 
have been brought by a woman and, irrespective of 
who launched it, represented a win necessary to re-
dressing women’s inequality. It had no reciprocal effect 
on men; rather, it caught the state blatantly discrimi-
nating against women. 
Therefore, when the five women’s cases are add-
ed to the four men’s cases, the jurisprudential record 
gives little reason to celebrate the entrenchment of the 
guarantee of sex equality. The jurisprudence negates the 
rosy picture portrayed by the texts of the Charter and 
the Constitution Act, 1982.
Part 3. “There is Always Room for Improvement”
For those of us who follow and care about con-
stitutionalizing women’s equality rights, three possibil-
ities follow from the dismal picture I have just painted. 
One is to sit on our hands and hope that the justices on 
Supreme Court of Canada develop a better understand-
ing of women’s equality rights. The second is to give up 
on the law and resort to resistance and revolution to 
achieve women’s equality. The third is to recommend 
improvements to the current constitutional regime that 
governs women’s equality rights. This paper explores 
the ramifications of the third possibility without argu-
ing for it. There are too many unknowns to assess reli-
ably whether it holds promise.
I make six recommendations for improvements. 
Some derive from my conversations with women law-
yers who are arguing for the inclusion of gender equali-
ty provisions in constitutions being drafted in post-con-
flict societies, particularly in the Middle East North Af-
rica (MENA) region. I have learned much from these 
women and I owe my first recommendation for improv-
ing the Canadian Charter directly to them.
Detail the Harms 
When it comes to drafting gender equality pro-
visions for their constitutions, the women in the MENA 
region value the Convention on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW), which sets out 
a series of specific contexts in which women’s equali-
ty rights must be guaranteed.22 These contexts include 
marriage and the family, elections and political offices, 
education, employment, healthcare, as well as other ar-
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eas of social, economic, cultural, and political life. Put 
differently, the CEDAW model details the harms faced 
by women who claim equality rights. 
Although CEDAW was adopted by the Unit-
ed Nations in 1979 and by Canada in January 1982, I 
do not recall any discussion about using the CEDAW 
model of detailing the harms in the Charter. Instead, 
we discussed the general equality rights model set out 
in other international conventions, such as Article 2 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(999 U.N.T.S. 171 1976) and Article 2 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(993 U.N.T.S. 1976).
At the time, inserting the general equality rights 
model in the Charter seemed well ahead of what our 
American and British sisters had. In the U.S., there was 
no mention of sex equality in its Bill of Rights and, in 
Britain, there was neither a constitution and nor a bill of 
rights. However, the general equality rights model now 
seems vacuous in comparison to the CEDAW model of 
detailing the harms that women in the MENA region 
favour. Detailing harms might make it harder for the 
Supreme Court of Canada to deny them.
Moreover, the MENA region women answer the 
criticism that the CEDAW model may omit some kinds 
of harm by pointing out that CEDAW’s list of harms has 
withstood the test of time. They also argue that nothing 
precludes adopting both models—the CEDAW model, 
detailing the specific harms that women face when they 
seek equality rights, and the general sex equality rights 
model that Canada currently has in the Charter.
Advocate Women’s Equality 
The women in the MENA region also talk about 
whether equality rights should be framed in terms of 
sex or gender or women. Many prefer the CEDAW ap-
proach of naming women as the equality seekers. In 
contrast, during the Charter debates, there was little, 
if any, discussion about guaranteeing of equality rights 
only to women.23 Since the Charter uses sex equality in 
section 15 and male and female persons in sections 28 
and 35(4), men can and have made Charter-based sex 
equality claims. 
Moreover, as I already noted, men won two of 
their cases at the Supreme Court of Canada, unlike 
women who lost all of their sex equality cases at the 
court. In the more egregious of these wins, the Trociuk 
case, a man was given the right to include his surname 
in his child’s surname to show his biological ties to the 
child.24 If you are tempted to ask “What’s the harm?,” 
consider the outcome for the mother who was raising 
the child—actually triplets—as a single parent. The 
court condemned her to years of bureaucratic educa-
tional and healthcare hassles because the children do 
not have her surname. 
Put differently, if sex equality rights are recip-
rocal, what men win women lose. This outcome could 
be avoided if the Charter were framed like CEDAW, 
guaranteeing equality rights to women (and not to 
men—who have experienced centuries of privilege 
and power).
Delete Formal Equality 
The legal meaning of the word “equality” is not 
self-evident. Neither CEDAW nor the Charter includes 
a definition of equality. However CEDAW guidelines25 
and Charter cases26 both proclaim a willingness to de-
fine equality as a substantive, and not a formal, right. 
Substantive equality remediates historical disadvan-
tage and oppression; formal equality offers to equalize 
the opportunities of those who are similar (Hughes 
1999). Critics maintain that, while the judges give lip 
service to substantive equality in Charter cases, they, 
in fact, apply formal equality (McIntyre 2006, 99). 
The problem with formal equality is that it 
remedies only gender-specific statutes. For example, if 
a statute bans women from doing something, formal 
equality will kick in to reject the ban. However, most 
legislation today is not gender-specific; most laws are 
expressed in gender-neutral terms. 
To illustrate, in the Symes case, a woman lawyer 
challenged the gender-neutral definition of the busi-
ness expense deduction in the Income Tax Act.27 She 
argued that the business expense deduction should in-
clude the actual cost of childcare, an expense mainly in-
curred by women, just as it includes expenses claimed 
mainly by men such as cars, expensive dinners, golf 
club memberships, etc. The Canadian Supreme Court’s 
decision in Symes was gendered. The male judges de-
nied her sex equality claim because they could not see 
any difference between women and men with respect 
to costs supporting professionals. In other words, they 
relied on formal equality. In contrast, the women on 
the court dissented because they recognized that the 
gender neutral wording of the business expense de-
duction obscured its gendered effect. The legislation 
deterred most mothers, but not most fathers, from set-
ting up businesses because they could not deduct the 
cost of childcare.
Formal equality should be deleted from judicial 
minds. However, it is not precisely clear how we achieve 
this since formal equality is not written into the Char-
ter. If we write substantive equality into the Charter, will 
that make a reality out of the current lip service that 
the judges give to it? Perhaps we need to say that gen-
der-neutral statutes call for substantive equality analy-
sis?
Make Equality Absolute
We all know the rhetoric “no rights are absolute” 
and I suggest that it is time to challenge this rhetoric 
in women’s equality rights cases. “No rights are abso-
lute” is a way of saying that the state is allowed to justify 
infringing women’s equality rights by invoking section 
128 and the Oakes test.29 The women in the equal pay 
case (NAPE) were the only women to make a successful 
section 15 argument, but they ultimately lost because 
the Canadian Supreme Court held that a financial crisis 
justified denying women equal pay.30 
No one mentioned section 28 of the Charter, 
which guarantees equality rights to female persons 
“notwithstanding anything in this Charter,” a clear state-
ment that women’s equality rights should be construed 
as absolute. It is time to change the neglect of section 
28 and to give it a robust role in guaranteeing women’s 
equality without the limitations imposed by section 1.
There is another reason for making women’s 
equality rights absolute. In recent cases involving po-
lygamy31 and niqab-wearing Muslim women,32 gov-
ernments have used women’s equality rights to justify 
criminalizing the women who live in polygamous rela-
tionships and requiring Muslim women to remove their 
niqab to testify in court. Put differently, instead of wom-
en using equality rights to fight governments (which is 
what the women who lobbied for equality rights intend-
ed), governments have deployed equality rights against 
women—the women who live in polygamous relation-
ships or wear the niqab.
Stop Comparing Women 
From its first equality decision,33 the Supreme 
Court of Canada has insisted that equality is a compar-
ative concept. This conceptualization is not written into 
the Charter and some feminists are critical of it (Pothier 
2006). As long as the Charter is expressed in terms of sex 
equality, I am prepared to accept comparison provided 
it is governed by substantive and not formal equality. 
What I cannot condone is the court’s use of some equal-
ity rights—usually, but not always, age equality—to hide 
the fact that women are being compared to women. 
This happened in two cases involving social 
security benefits: Law v Canada34 and Withler v Can-
ada.35 The outcomes would be farcical if they were not 
so problematic. In Law, the younger widow lost on the 
grounds that only older widows required survivor’s 
benefits under the Canada Pension Plan; younger wid-
ows could find employment or re-marry. However, the 
reverse prevailed in Withler, with the older widows los-
ing to younger widows on the grounds that only the 
younger widows needed the unreduced supplementa-
ry death benefits available under federal public servant 
and armed forces pension plans; older widows either 
had more money or had less need of money. Neither 
case was litigated as a sex equality case; yet, they were 
both cases where the equality seekers were predomi-
nantly women. By deciding them as age, and not sex 
equality, cases, the court made women fight women 
when the real issue in both cases was women versus the 
state (Baines 2012b). We need to ensure that this kind of 
manipulation does not reoccur.
Recognize Intersectionality
Ever since feminist and anti-racist theorists be-
gan to argue for recognition of intersectional equality 
rights claims, feminist legal scholars have recognized 
the artificiality of constitutional litigation strategies that 
force women to choose between their race and their 
sex when advancing equality rights claims (Crenshaw 
1989). Some theorists would limit intersectionality to 
claims made on the basis of race and sex. However, oth-
ers argue that other forms of singular classification also 
hamstring equality claimants such that we should con-
sider various combinations of intersectionality, includ-
ing combinations that may be more than twofold. 
Recent Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence 
yields a number of cases based on ageism that should 
have been argued as age and sex because the group bur-
dened was predominantly female.36 Similarly, women 
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litigated or were predominantly burdened in some of 
the disability equality cases.37 Three of the marital sta-
tus equality cases were litigated by women who were 
discriminated against as much because of their sex as 
their marital status.38 Three women launched the only 
national origin equality case39 and at least two of the 
Aboriginal status cases arose out of dislocations wom-
en could trace back to the inequalities inflicted by sec-
tion 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act.40 Finally, the niqab case 
implicated both religious and sex equalities,41 while the 
polygamy reference focused on the harm to women 
who subscribed to polygamy for religious reasons.42
Recognizing intersectionality is essential to un-
derstanding the substantive discrimination that wom-
en face because of sex and other grounds that make up 
their lived experience. Forcing them to choose between 
or among grounds is not only unrealistic, it may fail to 
expose the depth of the injustices they face.
Conclusion
All of the improvements that I suggest will re-
quire constitutional amendments. The lesson of the 
Charter era is that we should always be ready to propose 
constitutional amendments that would improve wom-
en’s equality rights. If the Prime Minister tries to change 
the composition of the Senate without adopting a con-
stitutional amendment and if Québec and other prov-
inces successfully challenge the constitutionality of his 
approach, we may be back at the constitutional amend-
ment table. Should this come to pass, women should be 
ready to propose their equality rights amendments.
To return to the question that opened this pa-
per: is it wrong to celebrate the work of the women who 
lobbied for more meaningful equality rights during 
the debates surrounding the adoption of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982? My answer is that it is never wrong to 
celebrate women who work to better the lives of other 
women. However, my better advice is to move on: find 
new ways to address the injustices that women face in 
Canada because equality rights jurisprudence has yet to 
measure up to the aspirations of those who supported 
constitutionalization.
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